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Abstract
This paper shows how Political Correctness may eliminate market-discrimination
(i.e., wage-gaps). The rationale for this effect is that speech may permit others to
gauge the viability of discriminatory actions in a social context. Political Correct-
ness can, hence, increase the welfare of the discriminated group despite speech being
per-se harmless. The paper contributes to the literature on Political Correctness,
by pointing out non-trivial benefits from it; to the literature on discrimination,
by suggesting an alternative mechanism for discrimination; and to legal theory, by
exposing some trade-offs involved with the freedom of expression. The model is con-
sistent with real-life phenomena like the unequal “forbidding of words”, the social
segregation and integration patterns, and the failure of hate-speech laws to reduce
discrimination.
JEL: J15, J7, K42
Keywords: Political Correctness, Free Speech, Discrimination, Imperfect En-
forcement.
1 Introduction
Political Correctness can be defined as informal censorship of speech:1 it is not legally
enforced, it does not follow any written rules, and it is usually backed up by sanctions
that are socially enforced—like ostracism or economic embargoing.
∗Banco de Me´xico. Email: ggomezr@alum.bu.edu
†I would like to thank Kevin Lang, participants at the Boston University Microeconomics Theory
Workshop, participants of the seminar at Banco de Me´xico as well as Carlos Lever.
1While the phenomenon of informal censorship is centuries old, the term “political correctness” is
relatively new. For an account of its probable origins—around 1940—see Feldstein (1997).
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What makes Political Correctness such an interesting phenomenon is its deep involve-
ment with beliefs shared by the community—beliefs about the qualities of those who stick
to the “correct” expressions and those who don’t.
The complexity of the Political Correctness phenomenon is portrayed in Loury (1994).
Therein one can read about the subtleties of language in the post-war Germany, and
about the contradictions involved in the “Sanctions Debate” (when the struggle of blacks
in South Africa required the U.S. government to impose trade sanctions), among other
historical anecdotes of the Political Correctness phenomenon.
Loury noted in his essay that he had mostly ignored any possible benefits of Political
Correctness, and that these remained to be investigated. As for the costs, he did not
provide any explicit modeling of the phenomenon; instead, he pointed out that the theory
of conformity proposed by Bernheim (1994) could be adapted for this purpose.2
The main contribution of this paper lies precisely in proving the existence of benefits
from Political Correctness under non-trivial assumptions.3 This is done by showing how
socially-enforced censorship of speech may reduce, or even eliminate, output-wasteful
discrimination in a particular instance, namely at the workplace.
The paper also contributes to the search for alternative formulations of prejudice. As
Charles and Guryan (2007) report, the Becker-mechanism of discrimination accounts for
only one quarter of the wage-gap, and is a particular form of racial animus: an aversion
for cross-racial contact. The mechanism presented herein provides testable implications,
and might account for part of the unexplained wage-gap. Unlike the two most popular
discrimination theories—distaste for association and statistical discrimination—this pa-
per’s theory requires both, assumptions on preferences and on technology. If found to
be consistent with the data—this would encourage further research along both types of
assumptions.
Last but not least, this article also contributes to the law literature concerning the
tension between free-speech and non-discrimination,4 and more generally to the legal
theory, by exposing some trade-offs involved with freedom of expression.
2A few years later, Morris (2001) modeled the costs of Political Correctness, as portrayed by Loury,
in a game where an informed advisor wishes to convey her valuable information to an uninformed action-
taker with identical preferences; the conflict arises because the action-taker believes there is a positive
probability that the advisor is actually “bad” (i.e., has the opposite preferences). As a consequence,
reputational concerns will give the “good advisor” an incentive to send sometimes false signals. If these
reputational concerns are sufficiently important, the result goes, no information is conveyed in equilibrium
(just like Loury contended).
3The benefits are shown to exist even if language is per se harmless.
4See, for example, Coliver et al (1992).
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The acknowledgement of this tension between free-speech and non-discrimination dates
back to (at least) 1951: the year of the controversial Supreme Court case Dennis v.
United States.5 The preamble to this case is that american leaders of the Communist
Party were indicted and convicted “for willfully and knowingly conspiring [. . . ] to teach
and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by
force and violence”. The Supreme Court was then asked to determine whether the Smith
Act (under which the leaders where convicted) violated the First Amendment (which
guarantees the right to free speech).
While the court was divided in the decision, most Justices agreed that free speech is
not an absolute right, and their differences of opinion had more to do with where to draw
the line. Implicit in the main opinion of the case was the argument that due to the stealthy
nature of communist activists (“the Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization,
adept at infiltration into strategic positions, use of aliases, and double meaning language;
[...] the Party is rigidly controlled”), the state could not wait until right before a putsch
(“Obviously, the words cannot mean that, before the Government may act, it must wait
until the putsch is about to be executed”).Overall, the statements from the case suggest
that it is the limited monitoring capacity of the state what makes speech less of an absolute
right : in a world with perfect monitoring/law enforcement, the state could permit any
utterances yet guarantee that these would never end up in acts of crime; in a world with
imperfect monitoring/law enforcement though, limiting speech may limit crime as well,
thus freedom of speech becomes relative to the benefits of restriction.
This paper captures the concerns of the Supreme Court by incorporating imperfect
monitoring/enforcement and proving how these concerns may indeed be effectively alle-
viated by the restriction of speech.
The two pillars for the mechanism that is posited by the paper are partial-misanthropic
preferences and imperfect enforcement.6 The model provided in the paper should be seen
only as an illustration of this mechanism.
The particular game-theoretic model is as follows. It is assumed that there are two
groups of workers in the population, and that they both have distinct identifiable traits.
Following the conventions in the discrimination literature, suppose there is a group of
black workers and a group of white workers. Furthermore, suppose that not all but some
of the white workers dislike black workers (henceforth “racist whites”). This trait (being
5All the corresponding quotations come from Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), both the
Syllabus and the main Opinion of the case.
6The “partial-misanthropic” qualifier refers to the fact that the individual is not entirely misanthropic
but just misanthropic with regard to a proper subset of humankind. A more colloquial / less pretentious
term would perhaps be “spiteful preferences”, or simply “hatred” as in Glaeser (2005).
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racist) is private information though. In other words, there are both racist whites and
non-racist whites, but it is impossible to tell them apart. A key premise of the mechanism
is that enforcement of property rights is imperfect. In the particular case of this model,
enforcement is imperfectly done by the workers themselves: in general, all the workers like
to enforce property rights, and will denounce any law-breaker that they catch; but racist
whites differ in that they do not denounce the sabotage of blacks, and they themselves
like to sabotage blacks.7
Typically, the three types of workers are found in the workplace, yet they do not
necessarily know each other’s types (again, it is not possible to tell if whites are racists
or not just by appearance).
Intuitively, if the white population is known to be mostly racist, racists will “feel at
home” and tend to sabotage black workers freely. But, if the white population is more
evenly split between racist and non-racist types, those few racists in the population will
face a dilemma. There is still a chance that their white coworkers are racist as well
(they are only a sample of the population). But if they choose to sabotage and their
white coworkers are not racist, they will likely get caught and be punished. They would
therefore be much better off if they could only tell the type of their white coworkers.
One way to do this is by noticing whether these coworkers use racial slurs in their daily
conversations.
The first result of the paper shows that if racists stick to a racist speech-code (or,
put simply, a speech-code that differentiates them from non-racists), they will—some of
the time—indeed be able to sabotage blacks with a very small chance of getting caught.
Hence, blacks will end up being sabotaged some of the time, thus producing (and earning)
less, on average.
Again, the intuition is straightforward: racists will only sabotage if they “sense”
enough support from the rest of the white workers. This gauging of the support oc-
curs precisely by paying attention at the messages that their white coworkers send. A
racist white is likely to send a racist message, a non-racist is likely to send a non-racist
message.
In real life, the racist or non-racist character of messages is predetermined by historical
evidence.8 The model will therefore take this character of messages as given. Thus
obviating the artifact of having nature choose which message is considered racist.
Given the aforementioned result, it becomes tempting to eliminate sabotage by having
a “safety quota” of black workers in every firm (if that firm is to have black workers at
7The idea that sabotage can take place at the workplace is not new. See, for example, Lazear (1989).
8Indeed, as expressed in the main opinion of Dennis v. United States: “Nothing is more certain
in modern society than the principle that [. . . ] a name, a phrase, a standard has meaning only when
associated with the considerations which gave birth to the nomenclature.”
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all). The second result of the paper formalizes this possibility.
Unfortunately, safety quotas are likely to produce partial segregation, thus undermin-
ing or limiting social cohesion. If only speech was absent, blacks would avoid the type of
discrimination mentioned before; but speech cannot be eliminated by decree. Could it be
censored by citizens themselves? And if so, would non-discrimination still follow?
The answer is found in the third result of the paper, which gives sufficient conditions
for discrimination to be eliminated when the white non-racist workers selectively censor
speech by sanctioning “politically-incorrect” utterances.9
The reduction or elimination of discrimination obtained does not follow mechanically
though; it depends crucially on the preexisting levels of racism (both the extent and
intensity). In fact, in some circumstances, Political Correctness could “backfire” and
further increase discrimination. The last result of the paper covers this possibility.
Thus, the model provides some testable implications for empirical research; and, as
usual, applies to any type of discrimination based on identifiable traits, be it gender, race,
height, etc.10
Together, the results of the paper are quite useful in explaining recurrent phenomena,
like the following.
Forbidden Words It is often contended by self-proclaimed non-racists that “it is not
fair” when they are sanctioned for using the same words that blacks use all the time
without consequence. These individuals consider that their rights are violated, and that
these violations are selective—hence discriminating—since they do not apply to the first
discriminated group: “how come black people can use the ‘N’ word and I can’t?”
This observation is consistent with the model. In it, blacks need not be censored
because their speech has no further consequence; it does not reveal anything. On the other
hand, in the model, even if a white worker is not racist she cannot utter the “forbidden
word(s)” because no one knows if she is actually racist or not, and therefore no one knows
if she is—or not—actually “encouraging” other racists to sabotage.
9The result assumes that only non-racist whites censor/sanction, thus avoiding any concerns of directed
speech (e.g. what if racists only talk when no blacks are around?). Needless to say, the result only
strengthens if blacks censor/sanction as well.
10Identifiable traits are not limited to the phenotype; nationality, religion, sexual preferences, socioe-
conomic background, and others can often be (if only noisily) identified from accents, tastes, clothes,
manners, and so on. Often, individuals could “pass” for other types, but they may not want to do so
despite the bearing.
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Integration vs Segregation As pointed out some paragraphs before, one of the ad-
vantages of Political Correctness is that it allows for integration. This should imply at
least some correlation between regimes of self-censorship and integration. The historical
accounts for the U.S. seem to support this assertion: when the use of racial slurs was
quite common and went unpunished, there was clearly more segregation than now, when
racial slurs are not as common and tend to be—at least socially—punished.
Relevance of Workplace-Size Although the mechanism can be explained with only
three workers (and the reader has probably figured this out by now), the model we employ
for illustration includes the size of the workplace (i.e., the number of workers in a common
area). Intuitively, the “sanction” of “incorrect” messages can be smaller, the smaller the
crowd is (i.e., very subtle when in petit comite´); this is mirrored by the model and is just
one example of workplace-size effects that can be found.11
The Failure of Hate-Speech Laws to Reduce Discrimination As we have argued
before, speech cannot be eliminated by decree. It is practically impossible to enforce
hate-speech laws because speech is ubiquitous. And so, except for mainstream media,
the presence of hate-speech cannot be effectively eliminated by traditional enforcement
instruments (e.g., police surveillance). Censorship by the citizens themselves, however,
might get around this.
Coliver (1992) offers plenty of evidence that hate-speech laws have not worked (partic-
ularly in countries with considerable preexisting discrimination), sometimes even ending
up in more discrimination.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is a brief preamble to the game-
theoretical model. Section 3 presents the game itself. Section 4 states the result that in a
setting with imperfect enforcement and free speech, on-the-job discrimination is close to
unavoidable; it also presents the short result that the use of quotas would eliminate on-
the-job discrimination. Section 5 has non-racist white workers selectively censor speech,
and presents the main result which establishes sufficient conditions for discrimination to
be eliminated. Section 6 touches upon the paradoxical fact that Political Correctness
might further hinder the discriminated group. Section 7 concludes.
11Throughout the paper we employ only one set of ’benchmark’ assumptions regarding both preferences
and sanctioning technology. The model, however, is flexible enough so as to allow future experimentation
and/or calibration of these assumptions.
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2 The Story
The model of this paper is a stylized version of a day at work. First, it assumes that there
are three types of workers: non-racist blacks (BN) non-racist whites (WN), and racist
whites (WR). They all have the same productive potential and only differ in two ways:
their skin color, and their preferences with regard to their coworkers.
In the usual taste-based models, racists experience disutility from having contact with
blacks. In this model, however, racists get disutility from nearby blacks’ wellbeing.12
This is modeled by having racists’ preferences equal non-racists’ preferences minus a term
reflecting blacks’ well-being. Thus, if UN(·) is the payoff of a non-racist player, then a
racist player will have a payoff UWR(·) = UN(·) − β UB(·), where UB(·) is the average
payoff for players of black type and β is the intensity of racism.13
The utility function UN(·) has both market goods/bads and non-market goods/bads
as arguments. In this particular model, market goods/bads are in the form of a paycheck,
and non-market goods/bads are in the form of punishments/scoldings (at the workplace)
by the boss and (social) sanctions (at the workplace) by coworkers.
The model begins with the hiring of a finite number of workers at random14 according
to the distribution (FBN , FWN , FWR), where Fθ is the percentage of the population of type
θ.
Next, all workers share the same workplace, they see each other and are able to identify
each other’s skin color.
Following that, workers produce one unit of output each.
At any workplace, employees have conversations from time to time; in the model this
is introduced as a simultaneous talk, where everyone sends a public message.15 Under
Political Correctness, which will not be covered until section 5, the utterance of a message
that is considered politically incorrect (for historical/exogenous reasons) leads to a social
sanction c > 0 by every non-racist white. Until that section though, c = 0 so that there
is absolute freedom of speech.16
12As to where do these type of (partial-misanthropic) preferences come from, Glaeser (2005) gives
an interesting suggestion. Grossly speaking, whenever there is a politically relevant and socially iso-
lated group, there are incentives (e.g., for politicians) to supply hate-creating stories about them.
Glaeser provides some historical evidence supporting this. In his model the utility function is “U =
Income Net of Taxes and Transfers+Expected Damage from the Out-Group− [Other terms]”; this spec-
ification is isomorphic to ours.
13The average payoff was chosen because it is scale invariant (doubling the number of players does not
affect payoffs) and discriminated-group-share invariant. This delivers a parsimonious benchmark.
14That is, there is no discrimination in the hiring decision.
15That is, each message is heard by every player.
16The paper employs a binary message space. The results carry on for more general message spaces.
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Also at any workplace, employees have to leave their working station unattended for
a while (to go to the bathroom, to go get some coffee, etc.). These moments represent an
opportunity for racists to sabotage. In the model, this opportunity is simply modeled as
a choice to wreck δ units of someone’s work:17 specifically, worker i chooses the action ai
to attack player j (ai = j) or to not attack anyone at all (ai = p). The symbol p stands
for “peaceful action”.18
The decision to sabotage is not trivial though, since there is a risk of being caught and
denounced, which translates into receiving a punishment tantamount to not being paid
any wage at all.
Regarding the risk of getting caught, the main premise is that workers generally do not
like to sabotage each other and denounce any law-breakers that they catch, the exception
being that racist-whites do not denounce the sabotage of blacks and they themselves like
to sabotage blacks.
There are many different plausible specifics satisfying the aforementioned premise
and delivering a similar result. We employ the one set of specifics that seemed most
straightforward and tractable to us: (a) Anyone sabotaging a white worker will be caught
with probability one, and (b) anyone sabotaging a black worker will be caught with a
probability equal to the share of non-racist workers.
Finally, each worker gets paid according to her/his observed output (which could be
less than originally produced if the worker was sabotaged). That is, we assume workers
are paid according to their individual, observable performance. Of course there are many
times when the performance of the group (as a whole) matters, but this paper will abstract
from those cases.
3 The Game
There are n players, and nature moves both at the beginning and at the end of the game.
The set of players is symbolized by N , thus N = { 1, 2, . . . , n }. Each player is of one of
these types: BN,WN,WR. The first letter of the type is observable (public information),
while the second is not (private information).
The order of the moves is as follows.
1. Nature chooses the vector θ from Θ ≡ {BN,WN,WR}n according to the common
prior.
17The terms “sabotage”, “attack”, and “wreck” will be used interchangeably.
18The game considers specifically one-on-one sabotage. Multiple sabotage—with the correspondingly
higher risk—yields similar results.
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The common prior is a discrete probability distribution given by the mapping19
Pθ : 2
Θ −→ [0, 1].
In what follows, Pθ(L(θ)) stands for the probability of the set S of vectors which
satisfy the logical statement L(θ), with S ⊆ 2Θ. Similarly, Pθ(L1(θ)|L2(θ)) stands
for the probability of the set S ′ of vectors which satisfy logical statement L1(θ) and
is a subset of the set S ′′ of vectors which satisfy logical statement L2(θ), with S ′
and S ′′ such that S ′ ⊆ S ′′ ⊆ 2Θ.20
Let x−i stand for the “subvector” that results from extracting the ith component
from vector x, for any vector x.
The common prior satisfies:
(a) Pθ(θi = BN |θ−i = θ¯−i) = FBN for every i ∈ N and any θ¯−i ∈ {BN,WN,WR}n−1.
(b) Pθ(θi = WN |θ−i = θ¯−i) = FWN for every i ∈ N and any θ¯−i ∈ {BN,WN,WR}n−1.
(c) Pθ(θi = WR|θ−i = θ¯−i) = FWR for every i ∈ N and any θ¯−i ∈ {BN,WN,WR}n−1.
(d) (FBN , FWN , FWR) is a probability distribution, i.e., FBN , FWN , FWR ≥ 0 and
FBN + FWN + FWR = 1.
In other words, the type of player i is i.i.d. with probabilities FBN , FWN , FWR for
each corresponding type.
Let I(L) be the indicator function, which takes the value one when the logical state-
ment L is true and zero otherwise. Let vi ≡ I(θi = BN) and let v ≡ (v1, v2, . . . , vn).
After Nature’s move, information is released as follows:
Player i knows θi and v; for all i ∈ N .
In other words, players know their own type and whether the other players are black
or white.
2. Players simultaneously move as follows:
Player i sends a message mi ∈ {M1,M2}; for all i ∈ N .
After all players simultaneously move, information is released as follows:
Player i knows the entire vector m ≡ (m1,m2, . . . ,mn); for all i ∈ N .
3. Players simultaneously move as follows:
Player i chooses an action ai ∈ A ≡ N ∪ {p}; for all i ∈ N .
19We write 2S to denote the set of all sets found in S, for any set S. Formally, 2S ≡ {X | X ⊆ S}.
This is sometimes known as the power set of S.
20By the definition of conditional probability, one has that Pθ(L1(θ)|L2(θ)) = Pθ(L1(θ) and L2(θ))Pθ(L2(θ)) .
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Let a ≡ (a1, a2, . . . , an).
No information is released.
4. Nature moves by choosing a vector b ∈ {0, 1}n according to the θ-dependant, dis-
crete probability function Pb : 2
{0,1}n −→ [0, 1].
Let #S stand for the cardinality (the size) of set S, for any set S. Pb satisfies:21
• Pb(bi = 1 | b−i = b¯−i) = 1 − Pb(bi = 0 | b−i = b¯−i) = #{j∈N|θj 6=WR}n for every
i ∈ N and any b¯−i ∈ {0, 1}n−1.
In other words, bi is an i.i.d. Bernoulli draw with success probability
#{j∈N|θj 6=WR}
n
.
After nature moves, terminal nodes are reached and payoffs are given according to
the Payoff Function that follows.
Define Nθ = { j ∈ N | θj = θ } to shorten the notation. Without loss of generality,
and for the whole paper, let M1 be the exogenously/historically determined “politically
incorrect” message.
The Payoff function for player i, Ui : {BN,WN,WR}n × {0, 1}n × {M1,M2}n ×An −→ R,
is given by:
Ui(θ, b,m,a) =
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
](
1− I(ai 6= p)
[
I(ai ∈ NBN)bi + I(ai /∈ NBN)
])
− I(θi 6= BN and mi = M1) c #NWN
max{1,#{j ∈ N|θj 6= BN and mj = M1}}
− I(θi = WR) β
#NBN
∑
θj=BN
Uj(θ, b,m,a) .
This is the general payoff function. It will be described in greater detail in sections 4
and 5.
The structure of the game, including the number of players and the probabilities for
both of nature’s moves, is common knowledge.
Only type-symmetric equilibria in pure strategies are considered in the paper, and
the proofs employ Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.22 We focus on “type-symmetric”
equilibria—which means that individuals of the same type have the same strategies—
because we care about the behavior of agents as a function of their type (and nothing
21We use the same notational convention as for Pθ above.
22Nonetheless the proofs can be extended to use Sequential Equilibrium.
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else). That is, we only care about the behavior of a worker given that he is a racist-white,
a non-racist white, or a non-racist black. The paper focuses only on pure strategies for
simplicity.
3.0.1 The Wage and its Expectation, the Speech Regimes, and the Parameter
Space
The wage of player i, written wi, is the first factor in the first summand of the payoff
function. That is,
wi =
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
]
.
This is what i’s observable output amounts to at the end of the game: one unit of output
minus that destroyed by the others.23
Both the social sanction for sending a politically incorrect message and the punishment
for sabotaging are assumed non-pecuniary, for matters of wage comparison.24
Let Ω ≡ {BN,WN,WR}n × {0, 1}n, which is the set of all the possible two moves
that nature can make. We write ω˜ ≡ (θ˜, b˜) for any element of Ω, and we may call the
former a state and the latter the state-space. We write ω ≡ (θ, b) for the chosen moves
by nature, and we may call it the realized state.
The expected wage for players of type θ is defined as the expectation of the average
wage for the players of type θ in state ω˜, taken over all ω˜ ∈ Ω according to the probability
distribution given in the first part of this section.25 That is,
E[wθ] = Eω
[
1
#Nθ
∑
θi=θ
wi
]
=
∫
Ω
[
1
#Nθ
∑
θi=θ
wi
]
dP (ω˜) ,
where the measure P is composed of both Pθ and Pb.
23The non-negativity constraint was left out for simplicity. The results carry on regardless.
24Notice non-racist whites will sanction politically incorrect whites (white senders of message M1) even
if that includes themselves. This was left for the sake of simplicity; all results go through if one eliminates
self-sanctioning. Similarly, notice sabotage is punished even if done to oneself. Again, this was left for
the sake of simplicity; all results remain the same if one eliminates the punishments in these cases.
25Of course, wages are determined by the strategies, the parameters, and the moves by nature, so—
strictly speaking—the left-hand-side should have the strategies, the prior, and all the parameters as
arguments; this has been left out to keep the notation short.
Thus, expected wages will vary depending on the equilibrium being considered, and this definition will
allow us to make comparisons between different equilibria and/or parameters.
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The set of possible values for the social sanction (i.e., the non-negative real numbers)
can be partitioned into two sets (or regimes)—each with an intuitive interpretation: the
“freedom of speech” regime (where c = 0) and the “political correctness” regime (where
c > 0). These two cases are dealt with separately in sections 4 and 5 respectively.
The remaining exogenous variables (β, δ, FBN , FWN , FWR and n) are called the param-
eters. The set of parameters satisfying the following restrictions is called the parameter-
space:
• F has full support,
• 0 < β, δ < 1, and
• n ≥ 3;
where the distribution F = (FBN , FWN , FWR) is said to have full support if all types have
a strictly positive probability; that is, if FBN , FWN , FWR, > 0.
4 Free Speech
Under Free Speech, c = 0, which means there is no censorship; the payoff functions are
much simpler. For both of the non-racist types the payoff becomes
Ui(θ, b,m,a) =
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
](
1− I(ai 6= p)
[
I(ai ∈ NBN)bi + I(ai /∈ NBN)
])
.
The first factor is simply the wage that i gets. As previously said, this is the observed out-
put at the end of the game—one minus delta times the number of workers that sabotaged
i.
The second factor is one minus the existence of a non-pecuniary punishment for sab-
otage (i.e., if it exists the value is one, otherwise it’s zero). This punishment takes place
when i sabotages (ai 6= i) a black worker (ai ∈ NBN) with probability Pr[bi = 1] =
#{ j∈N|θj 6=WR }
#N , and when i sabotages (ai 6= i) a white worker (ai /∈ NBN) with probability
one.
On the other hand, the racist’s payoff is
Ui(θ, b,m,a) =
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
](
1− I(ai 6= p)
[
I(ai ∈ NBN)bi + I(ai /∈ NBN)
])
− β
#NBN
∑
θj=BN
Uj(θ, b,m,a) ,
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consistent with section 2’s expression: UWR(·) = UN(·)− βUB(·).
The next proposition establishes the aforementioned perverse quality of the free-speech
regime.
Proposition (Open Doors for Discrimination under Free Speech). For the whole parameter-
space:
If βδ ≥ 1/n, then there exists an equilibrium where the expected wage of a black type is
strictly less than that of any white type.
Notice that the proposition remains true no matter how small the share of the population
with racist preferences is.
Surely, one could argue that this outcome cannot be an economic equilibrium because
“in real life” under-payed black workers would switch to better work environments. But
this will not be the case in an economy where mobility is costly, and/or where the expected
benefit from moving to another job is not big enough as to offset this moving cost.26
All that is necessary for this equilibrium to hold is for WRs to send a different message
than for WNs—indeed this is an equilibrium that is separating in messages from the
white workers. This separation is possible because there is free speech, i.e., there is no
punishment for sending either message or, more precisely, for sending a different message
than the one other types send. Given this revealing mechanism and the fact that types
are distributed randomly, there is always a positive probability that a black type will be
surrounded by racist whites. Since racist whites reveal themselves, they will know that
they constitute the majority and that the chance of “getting caught” is minimal, thus
making it worthwhile to sabotage the black type.
One would naturally expect that avoiding situations where racist whites are a majority
could eliminate discrimination in the present setting. Unfortunately, racist whites are
indistinguishable from their non-racist counterparts; therefore employers would have to
restrict the share of all white workers (or alternatively require a minimum share of black
workers). Let Fˆθ =
#Nθ
#N . The next claim formalizes this possibility.
Claim 1 (Effectiveness of Quotas). For the whole parameter-space:
Let employers be restricted to hire such that either zero or more than
√
βδn of their n
workers are black. Then, discrimination is eliminated, i.e., wages are equal for all types
in any equilibria and any realized state.
It is therefore sufficient to have the share of black workers be weakly greater than
√
βδ
or equal to zero. The intuition for the claim is that there is “safety in numbers”. But,
26The notion that mobility or information costs perpetuate differentials due to discrimination is for-
malized in Black (1995).
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importantly, a policy like this implies—in general—partial segregation since, whenever
0 < FBN <
√
βδ/n, not all of the firms will be able to have a mixture of blacks and
whites; some will have only whites despite this being an unlikely outcome under random
hiring with a high n, for example. If there are any reasons to avoid segregation, then
those same reasons would make quotas undesirable as well.
5 Political Correctness
Under the Political Correctness regime, c > 0, which means that non-racist whites will
sanction any white worker (they cannot know which one is or not racist) that utters the
exogenously/historically determined “politically incorrect” message M1. The fact that
c > 0 is not enough for discrimination to disappear though
The payoff functions become more complicated to take the sanction into account. For
non-racist black types the payoff function stays as before, but for non-racist whites it gets
a new, second line:
Ui(θ, b,m,a) =
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
](
1− I(ai 6= p)
[
I(ai ∈ NBN)bi + I(ai /∈ NBN)
])
− I(θi 6= BN and mi = M1) c #NWN
max{1,#{j ∈ N|θj ∈ {WN,WR} and mj = M1}} .
The second line stands for the social sanction that any white worker who sends a politically
incorrect message gets from every non-racist white that is present. Because more than
one worker may send the politically incorrect message, it is assumed that sanctions are
evenly split across all the whites who utter M1. Racists whites have—on top of this—the
usual disutility they get from blacks’ well-being:
Ui(θ, b,m,a) =
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
](
1− I(ai 6= p)
[
I(ai ∈ NBN)bi + I(ai /∈ NBN)
])
− I(θi 6= BN and mi = M1) c #NWN
max{1,#{j ∈ N|θj ∈ {WN,WR} and mj = M1}}
− I(θi = WR) β
#NBN
∑
θj=BN
Uj(θ, b,m,a) .
Define FW ≡ FWR + FWN to simplify notation. The main result of the paper follows.
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Theorem (Effectiveness of Political Correctness). For the whole parameter-space:
If
FWR
FW
+ βδ ≤ 1
2
(LER)
and
c > n · βδ ·
(
FWR
FWN
)
(HES)
then no discrimination exists, i.e., wages are equal for all types in any realized state of
any equilibria.
This result implies that even in the worse possible states, where all white players have
racist preferences and are many times the number of black players, no racist white player
will dare to perform an aggressive action. Notice that the sufficient lower bound (HES)
for the social sanction c is strictly positive, increasing in FWR, and decreasing in FWN .
Thus, Political Correctness eliminates resource-wasteful discrimination if two condi-
tions are met: there is a low enough level of racism (LER) both in extension and intensity,
and there is a high enough sanction (HES) for being politically incorrect.
6 Harmful Political Correctness
Before concluding the paper, we have to mention the paradoxical fact that Political Cor-
rectness may actually be harmful. Specifically, for high enough levels of racism, a restric-
tion of speech can result in an even higher amount of sabotage and—therefore—higher
wage-gaps.
Claim 2. There exist parameters for which Political Correctness is detrimental. That is,
there are parameters for which the Political Correctness regime has a lower expected wage
for type BN than the Freedom of Speech regime under some equilibria.
Intuitively, the randomness in hiring allows the existence of states where, despite the
share of racists being high enough to attack without any further information, racists will
be too few in the sample, and hence—under full revelation—will not attack. This effect
may go both ways, but—in general—does not cancel out. The proof shows this for a
particularly extreme case: that with n = 3. The reader can imagine how a big enough
FWR/FW might push all racists to attack in states where, under full revelation, they would
not have.27
27For n = 3, sabotage can only occur with one black and two white workers, and a racist worker will
not attack if he finds out that the other white worker is not racist. See subsection D.1 in the Appendix.
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7 Conclusion
This paper showed how political correctness, an implicit restriction of speech, may elimi-
nate discrimination. Thus, a benefit for the discriminated group was obtained despite the
harmless nature of speech. In addition, the model was shown to exhibit behavior consis-
tent with real-life phenomena like the unequal “forbidding of words”, the facilitating of
integration without the use of quotas, and the failure of hate-speech laws.
Unlike Loury (1994) and Morris (2001), the paper equates Political Correctness to a
regime where “incorrect speech” is sanctioned, and not to a message-pooling equilibrium;
in addition, it defines Freedom of Speech as a regime where no speech is punished at
all. This distinction is subtle but indispensable in order to realize that, while a social
sanction is indeed a device that may prevent the existence of a white-message-separating
equilibrium, it may not always have the “desired effect”: On the one hand, if the sanc-
tion is not strong enough, message-pooling will not necessarily follow. On the other
hand, preventing a white-message-separating equilibrium can—paradoxically—result in a
“worse” outcome. Therefore, setting the “Political Correctness vs Freedom of Speech”
and the “Message-Pooling vs Message-Separating” dichotomies apart ends up in a use-
ful approach.28 There is more to the phenomenon than a simple comparison between
message-pooling and message-separating equilibria.
Although the paper treated the decision to sanction as exogenous, it could be en-
dogenized by having non-racists receive part of the extra output, as long as the cost of
sanctioning remains low enough. This observation, together with the fact that the model
does not require the discriminated group to be a minority, suggests that the relevant
measure for discrimination is not that of the discriminated group’s population-share (i.e.,
whether they are a minority) but that of the output-loss due to the group’s discrimination.
It is extremely important to keep in mind that the censorship discussed herein is
enforced by society. As previously remarked, governments and their judicial branches
often want to censor “hate-speech” to reduce discrimination, but because of the ubiquitous
and hard-to-monitor nature of speech, government-imposed censorship policies that are
not widely supported by the population are doomed to fail, and have done so.29
When racism has considerable presence among the population, government interven-
tion through the media, education and other preference-modifying methods could prove
far more useful than the passing of hate-speech laws.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that the pillars of the paper’s mechanism are nothing
but a special case of a more general, almost tautological, hypothesis: discrimination arises
28Certainly, equating Freedom of Speech to a message-separating equilibrium would give the misleading
impression that a babbling equilibrium is absent whenever there is free speech.
29Again, see Coliver (1992).
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whenever preferences are not ‘difference-ignorant’ and the enforcement of ‘difference-
ignorant’ behavior is imperfect. This is worth pointing out because it means other similar
though less blatant mechanisms are relevant—and perhaps more plausible—as well.30
30Like a simple lack of cooperation instead of outright sabotage.
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A Notation for the Proofs
nθ ≡ #Nθ. In other words, nθ is the cardinality of the set Nθ.
ηθ(θ˜−i) ≡
∑n−1
j=1 I(θ˜−i,j = θ), where I(·) is the indicator function. That is, ηθ(θ˜−i) is the
number of players of type θ in the vector θ˜−i, for any vector θ˜−i ∈ {BN,WN,WR}n−1.
nW ≡ nWR+nWN . So nW is simply the number of white players. Notice nW = n−nBN =
n−∑nj=1 vj, thus nW is known whenever v is known.
ηW(θ˜−i) ≡ ηWN(θ˜−i) + ηWR(θ˜−i). Thus, ηW(θ˜−i) is the amount of white types in the
vector θ˜−i.
NW ≡ NWN ∪ NWR. So NW is simply the set of white players. It is clearly known
whenever v is known.
F˜WR(v¯, m¯) ≡ #{j∈N|m¯j=M1 and v¯j=0}n . So F˜WR(v¯, m¯) is the number of white players—
according to v¯—who sent the politically incorrect message—according to m¯—
divided by the total number of players.
Ii(θ¯i, v¯) ≡ {θ˜ ∈ Θ | θ˜i = θ¯i and I(θ˜j = BN) = v¯j for every j ∈ N}. That is, Ii(θ¯i, v¯) is
the information set where player i of type θ¯i finds himself after observing v¯ (i.e., at
the end of stage 1 of the game described in section 3). This information set contains
only those nodes θ˜ consistent with the information player i has up to that point: θ¯i
and v¯.
Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) ≡ {(θ˜, m˜) ∈ Θ × {M1,M2}n | θ˜i = θ¯i and I(θ˜j = BN) = v¯j for every j ∈
N and m˜ = m¯}. Thus Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) is the information set where player i of type θ¯i
finds himself after observing v¯ and “listening” m¯ (i.e., at the end of stage 2 in the
game described in section 3). This information set contains only those nodes (θ˜, m˜)
consistent with the information player i has up to that point: θ¯i, v¯, and m¯.
The rest of the notation employed has been introduced in the main text.
B Proof of the Proposition
The proof consists of three parts. First we propose an equilibrium. Second, we prove
that it is indeed an equilibrium. Third, we prove that, under the stated conditions, the
equilibrium has the stated implications.
There are many equilibria that can be used to prove the proposition. However, for the
sake of simplicity, we present just one that is particularly tractable.
19
B.1 The Proposed Equilibrium
B.1.1 Strategies
Strategies are as follows. Let mi(θ¯i, v¯) be the message that player i sends when at infor-
mation set Ii(θ¯i, v¯). Then it is given by
mi(θ¯i, v¯) = m(θ¯i, v¯) =
{
M1, if θ¯i = WR;
M2, otherwise.
Hereafter m(θ¯, v¯) ≡ (m(θ¯1, v¯),m(θ¯2, v¯), . . . ,m(θ¯n, v¯)).
Let ai(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) be the action that player i takes at information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯). Then
ai(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) = a(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) ={
minNBN , if θ¯i = WR and nBN > 0 and F˜WR(v¯, m¯) ≥ 1− βδnBN ;
p, otherwise,
where the players use the relations NBN = {j ∈ N | vj = 1}, nBN = #NBN , and
F˜WR(v¯, m¯) ≡ #{j∈N|m¯j=M1 and v¯j=0}n .
B.1.2 Beliefs
Beliefs are as follows. Let pii(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯) be the probability that player i assigns to being at
node θ˜ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯), given that he is at information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯). This probability is given
by
pii(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯) = F
ηWR(θ˜−i)
WR F
ηWN (θ˜−i)
WN
F
ηW (θ˜−i)
W
(
ηW(θ˜−i)
ηWR(θ˜−i)
)−1
where
(
e
d
)−1
=
(
d
e
)
= d!
e!(d−e)! , for any numbers d, e.
Let pi′i(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) be the probability that player i assigns to being at node (θ˜, m˜) ∈
Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯), given that he is at information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) indeed. This probability is
given by
pi′i(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) = pi′(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) =
{
1, if m(θ˜j, v¯) = m¯j for all j /∈ NBN ;
0, otherwise.
B.2 Proof that B.1 is an Equilibrium
For B.1 to be a Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, beliefs have to be weakly consistent,
and strategies have to be sequentially rational.
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B.2.1 Weak Consistency of Beliefs
Weak consistency of beliefs means that beliefs have to be consistent with Bayes’ rule
whenever possible (whenever information sets are reached with positive probability).
Consider first the beliefs given by pii(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯). For θ˜ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯), they have to satisfy
pii(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯) = Pr[θ = θ˜ | Pθ ]
Pr[θ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯) | Pθ ]
, whenever Pr[θ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯) | Pθ ] > 0.
Meaning that pii(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯) has to be equal to the probability of reaching node θ˜ divided by
the probability of reaching information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯)—of which θ˜ is an element, whenever
this information set has a positive probability of being reached. With both probabilities
conditional on the prior Pθ.
Because of the assumed—common—prior for the game (see section 3), all non-empty
information sets Ii(θ¯i, v¯) have a positive probability of being reached.
Given the independence of each player’s type, and the rules of probability, it follows
that, for any θ˜ ∈ Θ,
Pr[θ = θ˜ | Pθ ]
= Fθ˜iF
ηWR(θ˜−i)
WR F
ηWN (θ˜−i)
WN F
ηBN (θ˜−i)
BN
[
n!
1! ηWR(θ˜−i)! ηWN(θ˜−i)! ηBN(θ˜−i)!
]−1
.
Where the term before the brackets is the probability that nature’s chosen vector θ has
the same numbers of each type as vector θ˜, and the second term is one over the number
of such—equally likely—vectors. This second term is necessary because there is only one
such vector that has θ˜’s same ordering.
Similarly, it follows that, for any non-empty set Ii(θ¯i, v¯),
Pr[θ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯) | Pθ ]
= Fθ¯iF
n−1−∑j 6=i v¯j
W F
∑
j 6=i v¯j−1
BN
[
n!
1!(n− 1−∑j 6=i v¯j)! (∑j 6=i v¯j − 1)!
]−1
.
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Using both probabilities, we have that
Pr[θ = θ˜ | Pθ ]
Pr[θ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯) | Pθ ]
=
Fθ˜iF
ηWR(θ˜−i)
WR F
ηWN (θ˜−i)
WN F
ηBN (θ˜−i)
BN
[
n!
1! ηWR(θ˜−i)! ηWN (θ˜−i)! ηBN (θ˜−i)!
]−1
Fθ¯iF
n−1−∑j 6=i v¯j
W F
∑
j 6=i v¯j−1
BN
[
n!
1!(n−1−∑j 6=i v¯j)! (∑j 6=i v¯j−1)!
]−1 ,
or, simplifying a bit,
Fθ˜iF
ηWR(θ˜−i)
WR F
ηWN (θ˜−i)
WN F
ηBN (θ˜−i)
BN
[
ηWR(θ˜−i)! ηWN(θ˜−i)! ηBN(θ˜−i)!
]
Fθ¯iF
n−1−∑j 6=i v¯j
W F
∑
j 6=i v¯j−1
BN
[
(n− 1−∑j 6=i v¯j)! (∑j 6=i v¯j − 1)! ] .
Since θ˜ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯), it must be that θ¯i = θ˜i ,
∑
j 6=i v¯j−1 = ηBN(θ˜−i) , and n−1−
∑
j 6=i v¯j =
ηW(θ˜−i) . Therefore, we have
F
ηWR(θ˜−i)
WR F
ηWN (θ˜−i)
WN
[
ηWR(θ˜−i)! ηWN(θ˜−i)!
]
F
ηW (θ˜−i)
W
[
ηW(θ˜−i)!
] .
Using the fact that ηW(θ˜−i) ≡ ηWN(θ˜−i) + ηWR(θ˜−i) we get
F
ηWR(θ˜−i)
WR F
ηWN (θ˜−i)
WN
F
ηW (θ˜−i)
W
 ηW(θ˜−i)!
ηWR(θ˜−i)!
(
ηW(θ˜−i)− ηWR(θ˜−i)
)
!
−1 ,
but for d, e integers with d ≥ e ≥ 0 we have that d!
e!(d−e)! ≡
(
d
e
)
. Hence the previous
expression becomes
F
ηWR(θ˜−i)
WR F
ηWN (θ˜−i)
WN
F
ηW (θ˜−i)
W
(
ηW(θ˜−i)
ηWR(θ˜−i)
)−1
.
This is identical to the beliefs in B.1.2.
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Now consider the beliefs given by pi′(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯). For (θ˜, m¯) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) they have
to satisfy
pi′(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) = Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) = (θ˜, m¯) | Pθ ]
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ]
, (1)
whenever Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ] > 0. Meaning that pi′i(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) has to
be equal to the probability of reaching node (θ˜, m¯), under the pure substrategies m(·, ·),
divided by the probability of reaching information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯)—of which (θ˜, m¯) is an
element, under the pure substrategies m(·, ·), whenever the information set has a positive
probability of being reached. With both probabilities conditional on the prior Pθ.
By lemma 1—on page 27—we have that under equilibrium B.1, whenever the infor-
mation set has a positive probability of being reached, the beliefs / left hand side of
equation (1) become
pi′(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) =
{
1, if m(θ˜, v¯) = m¯;
0, otherwise.
(2)
So, we need to show that the right hand side of equation (1) is equal to this, when-
ever the information set has a positive probability of being reached. Let V (x) ≡ (I(x1 =
BN), I(x2 = BN), . . . , I(xn = BN)) for any x ∈ Θ. Ignoring the restriction Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈
Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ] > 0, we have that, for any (θ˜, m¯) ∈ Θ× {M1,M2}n,
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) = (θ˜, m¯) | Pθ ] =
{
Pr[θ = θ˜ | Pθ ], if m(θ˜,V (θ˜)) = m¯;
0, otherwise.
Now, let ϑ(v¯, m¯) be the element of Θ that is uniquely defined by31
1. V (ϑ) = v¯, and
2. mj(ϑj, v¯) = m¯j for all j ∈ NW .
Unlike previously, some of the non-empty information sets have zero probability of being
reached, because of the—pure—strategies. Ignoring the restriction Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈
Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ] > 0, we have that, for any non-empty set Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯),
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ] =
{
Pr[θ = ϑ(v¯, m¯) | Pθ ], if m(ϑ(v¯, m¯), v¯) = m¯;
0, otherwise.
(3)
31See lemma 2—on page 27—for the uniqueness of ϑ(v¯, m¯).
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Since F has full support and ϑ(v¯, m¯) ∈ Θ always exists uniquely,32 it follows that
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ] > 0⇐⇒m(ϑ(v¯, m¯), v¯) = m¯ (4)
Therefore, when Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) is reached with positive probability, we have that
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) = (θ˜, m¯) | Pθ ]
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ]
=
{
Pr[θ=θ˜|Pθ ]
Pr[θ=ϑ(v¯,m¯)|Pθ ] , if m(θ˜,V (θ˜)) = m¯;
0, otherwise;
and
m(ϑ(v¯, m¯), v¯) = m¯ .
Together both previous equations imply
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) = (θ˜, m¯) | Pθ ]
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ]
=
{
Pr[θ=θ˜|Pθ ]
Pr[θ=ϑ(v¯,m¯)|Pθ ] , if m(θ˜,V (θ˜)) = m(ϑ(v¯, m¯), v¯);
0, otherwise.
But, by lemma 3 on page 28, we know that whenever θ˜ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯), thenV (θ˜) = v¯
and m(θ˜,V (θ˜)) = m(ϑ(v¯, m¯), v¯) =⇒ θ˜ = ϑ(v¯, m¯). Therefore
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) = (θ˜, m¯) | Pθ ]
Pr[(θ,m(θ,v)) ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) | Pθ ]
=
{
1, if m(θ˜, v¯) = m¯;
0, otherwise.
Which is the same as the beliefs in equation (2).
B.2.2 Sequential Rationality
Sequential rationality means that all players make their moves such that their expected
payoff—conditional on their beliefs and everyone else’s strategies—is maximized at every
information set. In the case of this game, checking sequential rationality does not in-
volve any special technique and is easy, though very tedious, to perform thoroughly. We
therefore provide a more heuristic proof.
Note that, for the sake of space, we will proceed heuristically to show sequential
rationality since the methods involved are conventional and straightforward.
For player i, of type θ¯i 6= WR, at information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯), it is straightforward
to show that the action ai(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) is optimal.
If i chooses an aggressive action—chooses ai 6= p—then, in the best scenario—where i
is not caught/punished—he gets a payoff that is exactly equal to the payoff that he would
get—with certainty—by choosing the peaceful action—ai = p. Therefore, the peaceful
action is optimal.
32See lemma 2 for the existence of ϑ(v¯, m¯).
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For player i, of type θ¯i = WR, at information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯), it is slightly more
involved to show the optimality of its action ai(θ¯i, v¯, m¯).
Consider the case where nBN > 0 and F˜WR(v¯, m¯) ≥ 1 − βδnBN . Then—given the
strategies—we have that
nWR
n
≥ 1− βδ
nBN
,
⇔ βδ
nBN
≥ 1− nWR
n
.
Now, it turns out that the benefit that i gets—with certainty—from sabotaging any black
worker is precisely the left hand side of this last inequality: βδ
nBN
. On the other hand, the
expected cost is simply the probability that i gets caught times his wage—which under
the strategies is equal to one. Therefore the expected cost is 1 − nWR
n
. We know that
βδ
nBN
≥ 1− nWR
n
from the last equation, therefore the aggressive action is optimal in these
cases and only in these cases. Hence the peaceful action is optimal in the remaining cases.
For player i, of type θ¯i 6= WR, at information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯), it’s easy to show that
mi(θ¯i, v¯) is optimal.
For θi = BN the choice of message is inconsequential, therefore optimal. For θi = WN
the choice of message has some effects, but only on third parties. That is, it affects black
workers and racist white workers but non-racist white workers are not affected at all.
Therefore the message is optimal as well.
For player i, of type θ¯i = WR, at information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯), it is straightforward to
show the optimality of its message mi(θ¯i, v¯).
First, notice that—relative to the politically correct message—sending the politically
incorrect message has no cost—with certainty. On the other hand though, the expected
benefits—relative to sending the politically correct message—are positive since for some
states that occur with positive probability this will decrease blacks’ average utility even
further (remember racists attack depending on how great the number of white players
sending the politically incorrect message is).
B.3 Proof of the Implications from the Equilibrium
So far we have proposed an equilibrium and shown that it is indeed an equilibrium, but
we haven’t shown that the cases under which sabotage takes place actually happen with
positive probability.
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Given equilibrium B.1, we want to show that the expected wage of a black type is
strictly less than that of any white type (racist or non-racist). Recall that the wage of
player i is given by
wi =
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
]
,
and the expected wage of type θ is given by
E[wθ] = Eω
[
1
#Nθ
∑
θi=θ
wi
]
=
∫
Ω
[
1
#Nθ
∑
θi=θ
wi
]
dP (ω˜) .
Under the strategies of equilibrium B.1, the wage wi for any player i of type θi 6= BN is
equal to one, in any state:
θi 6= BN ⇒ wi = 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω .
Therefore the expected wage for type θ 6= BN equals one as well:
E[wθ] =
∫
Ω
[
1
#Nθ
∑
θi=θ
1
]
dP (ω˜) = 1, for θ 6= BN .
For player i of type θi = BN though, we have that in states where nWR > 0 and
βδ
nBN
≥
1− nWR
n
, the wage is less than one:
θi = BN and nWR > 0 and
βδ
nBN
≥ 1− nWR
n
=⇒ wi < 1 .
Otherwise the wage is trivially equal to one. Hence, all we need to show is that the set of
states with nWR > 0 and
βδ
nBN
≥ 1− nWR
n
(and nBN > 0 of course) has a positive probability.
Let Ωa be the set of such states, clearly Ωa ⊆ Ω. It is therefore sufficient if we show that
a non-empty subset of Ωa has positive probability.
Consider the states where exactly one player is black, and the rest are racist whites.
Since F has full support and n is finite, these states have a positive probability: FBNF
n−1
WR >
0. Moreover, these states are indeed in Ωa because nBN = 1 > 0, nWR = n−nBN = n−1 >
0 since n > 2, and βδ
nBN
≥ 1− nWR
n
since
βδ ≥ 1
n
by assumption of the proposition,
⇔ βδ
nBN
≥ nBN
n
since these states have nBN = 1,
⇔ βδ
nBN
≥ n− nWR
n
since these states have n = nBN + nWR,
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therefore
βδ
nBN
≥ 1− nWR
n
, which proves that these states are in Ωa.
Therefore Ωa has positive probability and the expected wage for type θ = BN is less then
one, i.e., the expected wage of blacks is less than that of any white type.
B.4 Lemmas employed in the Proof of the Proposition
Lemma 1. If Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) is reached with positive probability under equilibrium B.1, then
pi′(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) =
{
1, if m(θ˜, v¯) = m¯;
0, otherwise.
Proof. Under equilibrium B.1 the beliefs—which are presented in B.1.2—are given by
pi′i(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) = pi′(θ˜ | θ¯i, v¯, m¯) =
{
1, if m(θ˜j, v¯) = m¯j for all j /∈ NBN ;
0, otherwise.
That is, there is only one node in Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) with a positive probability. Hence, all we
need to show is that this node must comply with “m(θ˜j, v¯) = m¯j for all j ∈ NBN” as well.
But this must be true since the information set is reached with positive probability, i.e., all
the observed messages are sent according to the equilibrium strategy: mj = m(θ˜j, v¯) ∀j.
If Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯) is reached with positive probability it must therefore be that m¯j =
m(θ˜j, v¯) ∀j ∈ N for the only node that is reached with positive probability in Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯).
Lemma 2. Let ϑ(v¯, m¯) be an element of Θ that satisfies
1. V (ϑ) = v¯, and
2. mj(ϑj, v¯) = m¯j for all j ∈ NW .
Then, ϑ(v¯, m¯) exists and is unique for any (v¯, m¯) ∈ {0, 1}n × {M1,M2}n.
Proof. We can always construct such a ϑ, and it can only be done one way:
First, to comply with V (ϑ) = v¯, we have to set ϑj = BN whenever v¯j = 1. Second,
to comply with mj(ϑj, v¯) = m¯j for all j ∈ NW , we have to set
ϑj =
{
WR, if v¯j = 0 and mj = M1;
WN, if v¯j = 0 and mj = M2.
This assigns a unique type to every j ∈ N . Therefore ϑ exists and is unique.
27
Lemma 3. Let θ˜ ∈ Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯), then V (θ˜) = v¯ and
m(θ˜,V (θ˜)) = m(ϑ(v¯, m¯), v¯) =⇒ θ˜ = ϑ(v¯, m¯) .
Proof. V (θ˜) = v¯ follows immediately from the definition of the information set Ii(θ¯i, v¯, m¯)
on page 19.
V (θ˜) = v¯ implies ϑj = θ˜j for all j with v¯j = 1. That is, for those js both components
are BN .
On the other hand, m(θ˜, v¯) = m(ϑ(v¯, m¯), v¯) implies that for every j with v¯j = 0:
θ˜j = ϑj .
That is, under function m(·, ·), the type of all the white players is fully determined by
the message they send. Therefore θ˜j = ϑj for all j, and so θ˜ = ϑ(v¯, m¯).
C Proof of Claim 1
If nBN = 0 then, by necessity, there is no discrimination. So let us focus on the cases
where nBN >
√
βδn.
We have
nBN >
√
βδn ,
⇒ n2BN > βδn since
√
βδn > 0,
⇔ nBN
n
>
βδ
nBN
,
therefore
nBN + nWN
n
≥ nBN
n
>
βδ
nBN
.
The expression on the far left is the expected cost—relative to the peaceful action—of
sabotaging a black player after the cheap-talk stage, regardless of the equilibrium. The
expression on the far right is the expected benefit—relative to the peaceful action—of sab-
otaging a black player after the cheap-talk stage , regardless of the equilibrium. Therefore
in any (weak perfect bayesian) equilibrium the black players will not be sabotaged, since
this would go against sequential rationality.
White players are not sabotaged either, since the expected benefit is simply replaced
by zero regardless of the equilibrium.
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D Proof of the Theorem
First, in subsection D.1, we show that—for any equilibrium—there is no discrimination
in the states of the world with nW = 1. Therefore we have that discrimination can only
occur in states of the world with nW ≥ 2.
Notice that the set of all type-symmetric weak perfect bayesian equilibria can be
partitioned into the set of white-message-separating equilibria (those equilibria where
racist whites send a different message from non-racist whites in at least one state of
the world with nW ≥ 2) and the set of white-message-pooling equilibria (those equilibria
where both racist and non-racist whites send the same message in every state of the world
with nW ≥ 2).
In subsection D.2, we show that there is no equilibrium, in the white-message-pooling
class, where the aggressive action is chosen under “LER” (low enough racism).
Finally, in subsection D.3, we show that under “HES (high enough sanction) and
LER” the white-message-separating class is empty.
D.1 Discrimination can only occur in states of the world with
nW ≥ 2
If nW = 0 then, by necessity, there is no discrimination. So consider the remaining case
where nW = 1. Clearly, in this case the only white player does not face any uncertainty
with regard to θ (he knows his type and that of the others: BN).
Relative to the peaceful action, the expected benefit that a racist player gets from
sabotaging any black player is βδ
n−1 , while the expected cost he faces is
n−1
n
. Therefore
sequential rationality requires the choice of the aggressive action if and only if
βδ
n− 1 ≥
n− 1
n
,
⇔ βδ ≥ (n− 1)
2
n
but (n−1)
2
n
≥ 4
3
since n ≥ 3 by assumption. Therefore sequential rationality requires the
choice of the aggressive action if and only if
βδ ≥ 4
3
,
but this is impossible since 0 ≤ β, δ ≤ 1.
Corollary. Under n = 3 and a fully white-message-separating equilibrium:
If state ω˜ has nBN = nWN = nWR = 1, then no sabotage occurs.
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D.2 The class of white-message-pooling equilibria has no dis-
crimination under “LER”
Let θi = WR and nW ≥ 2. Under white-message-pooling, information set Ii(θi, v¯, m¯) is
equal to information set Ii(θi, v¯): Player i has the same information because racist whites
and non-racist whites are indistinguishable from their messages.
Let uai be the payoff that i gets from sabotaging a black player, and let u
p be the
payoff that i gets from being peaceful. Sequential rationality implies that i will choose
the aggressive action if and only if
E[uai − upi | Ii(WR, v¯)] ≥ 0
⇔ E
[
βδ
nBN
− bi
[
1− δ
∑
j∈N
I(aj = i)
]∣∣∣∣∣ Ii(WR, v¯)
]
≥ 0 ;
notice that sequential rationality also implies that no white player is sabotaged, since the
expected benefit is zero and the expected cost is positive given n ≥ 3, therefore
E
[
βδ
nBN
− bi
∣∣∣∣ Ii(WR, v¯)] ≥ 0 ;
the only uncertainty remaining is that due to bi, so
βδ
nBN
− E [bi | Ii(WR, v¯)] ≥ 0 ,
⇔ βδ
nBN
≥ E [bi | Ii(WR, v¯)] ;
by the law of iterated expectations we have
βδ
nBN
≥ E [E[bi | nWR] | Ii(WR, v¯)] ;
the expectation of a Bernoulli r.v. is simply its probability, so we have
βδ
nBN
≥ E
[
1− nWR
n
∣∣∣ Ii(WR, v¯)] ,
⇔ βδ
nBN
≥ 1− 1
n
E [nWR | Ii(WR, v¯)] ;
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the relevant information that player i possesses at information set Ii(WR, v¯) is nW itself
and nWR ≥ 1, so we may express the previous inequality as
βδ
nBN
≥ 1− 1
n
E [nWR | nW and nWR ≥ 1] ,
⇔ βδ
nBN
≥ 1− 1
n
[
1 + (nW − 1)FWR
FW
]
.
It turns out that this inequality contradicts the assumed condition “LER”:
FWR
FW
+ βδ ≤ 1
2
,
⇔ βδ ≤ 1− 1
2
− FWR
FW
,
⇒ βδ < 1− 1
3
− FWR
FW
,
⇒ βδ < 1− 1
n
− FWR
FW
since throughout the paper we have assumed n ≥ 3,
⇔ βδ <
(
1− FWR
FW
)
− 1
n
,
⇒ βδ <
(
1− FWR
FW
)
+
1
n
(
2
FWR
FW
− 1
)
since
FWR
FW
> 0 by assumption,
⇔ βδ < 1− 1
n
[
1 + (n− 2)FWR
FW
]
,
⇒ βδ
nBN
< 1− 1
n
[
1 + (nW − 1)FWR
FW
]
since discrimination requires n− 1 ≥ n− nBN = nW .
Therefore sequential rationality and condition “LER” assure that aggressive actions are
never chosen in white-message-pooling equilibria.
D.3 The class of white-message-separating equilibria is empty
under “HES and LER”
Suppose there exists a white-message-separating equilibrium. This means that therein,
for some v∗ ∈ {0, 1}n with nW ≥ 2, racist whites send a different message than non-racist
whites.
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To be an equilibrium, sequential rationality and weak consistency of beliefs have to
be satisfied. Therefore the sub-strategy of player i, ai(θ¯i, v¯, m¯), has to satisfy
ai(θ¯i,v
∗, m¯) = a(θ¯i,v∗, m¯) ∈
{
NBN if θ¯i = WR and nBN > 0 and F˜WR ≥ 1− βδnBN ;
{p} otherwise.
That racists attack blacks, if and only if nBN > 0 and F˜WR ≥ 1 − βδnBN , should not be a
surprise since a similar result was shown in the proposition.
What might have to be explained is that nobody attacks whites. This is because
for any equilibrium and realized state we have that, relative to the peaceful action, the
expected benefit from attacking a white player is zero, but the expected cost is strictly
positive. And this is true for everyone.
Now, there are two ways for having a white-message-separation: either racists or
non-racists send the politically incorrect message (M1), but not both. However, the
white-message separation with non-racists sending the politically incorrect message is
not sequentially rational for any c > 0: Relative to the politically correct message, M2,
non-racists get zero expected benefit and a strictly positive expected cost for sending the
politically incorrect message, M1.
So for c > 0, the only white-message-separating equilibria that may exist are those
where racists send the politically incorrect message, M1.
Therefore, in particular, our hypothetical equilibrium must satisfy the following se-
quential rationality condition for θi = WR:
E[upi − upc | Ii(θ¯i,v∗),m−i,a−i] ≥ 0 ,
where upi is the payoff from sending the politically incorrect message and attacking like
the other racists do, upc is the payoff from an alternative strategy to be presented below,
and the expectation is conditional on the information set Ii(θ¯i,v∗) and takes everyone
else’s strategies into account (here represented by m−i,a−i).
Let i’s alternative strategy, or pc strategy, satisfy
mpci (WR,v
∗) = M2
apci (WR,v
∗,m−i,m
pc
i ) ∈
{
NBN if F˜WR
′
(v¯, m¯) ≥ 1− βδ
nBN
;
{p} otherwise,
where F˜WR
′
(v¯, m¯) ≡ #{j∈N|m¯j=M1 and v¯j=0}+1
n
.
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We therefore have
E[upi − upc | Ii(θ¯i,v∗),m−i,a−i] ≥ 0 ,
(we drop the expectation’s conditionals in what follows, for the sake of space)
⇔ E
[
−cnWN
nWR
+ (nWR − 1) βδ
nBN
· I
(
F˜WR(v¯, m¯) ≥ 1− βδ
nBN
> F˜WR(v¯, m¯
′)
)]
≥ 0 ,
⇔ E
[
(nWR − 1) βδ
nBN
· I
(
F˜WR(v¯, m¯) ≥ 1− βδ
nBN
> F˜WR(v¯, m¯
′)
)]
≥ E
[
c
nWN
nWR
]
,
⇔ Pr
[
F˜WR(v¯, m¯) ≥ 1− βδ
nBN
> F˜WR(v¯, m¯
′)
]
E
[
(nWR − 1) βδ
nBN
]
≥ E
[
c
nWN
nWR
]
,
where the expectation on the left side is conditional on the statement of the probability,
⇔ Pr
[
nWR ≥ n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)
> nWR − 1
]
E
[
(nWR − 1) βδ
nBN
]
≥ E
[
c
nWN
nWR
]
,
(in what follows we use the so-called ceiling function; this function maps any real number
x to the smallest integer that is weakly greater than x; it is written as dxe)
⇔ Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉]
E
[
(nWR − 1) βδ
nBN
]
≥ E
[
c
nWN
nWR
]
,
since the expectation on the left side is conditional on the statement of the probability,
we have
⇔ Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉]
E
[
(nWR − 1) βδ
nBN
∣∣∣∣nWR = ⌈n(1− βδnBN
)⌉]
≥ E
[
c
nWN
nWR
]
,
⇔ Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉](⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉
− 1
)
βδ
nBN
≥ E
[
c
nWN
nWR
]
,
⇔ Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉]⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)
− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
≥ E
[
c
nWN
nWR
]
,
We pause here to notice that the probabilities and expectations are conditional on nWR ≥ 1
since i knows his type, thus having
Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉∣∣∣∣nWR ≥ 1] = Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉]
Pr[nWR 6= 0] .
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And also having
E
[
c
nWN
nWR
| nWR ≥ 1
]
= c · E
[
nW − nWR
nWR
∣∣∣∣nWR ≥ 1]
= c ·
nW∑
h=1
Pr[nWR = h | nWR ≥ 1] · nW − h
h
= c ·
∑nW
h=1 Pr[nWR = h] · nW−hh
Pr[nWR 6= 0]
Therefore the inequality becomes
Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉]
Pr[nWR 6= 0]
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)
− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
≥ c ·
∑nW
h=1 Pr[nWR = h] · nW−hh
Pr[nWR 6= 0] ,
⇔ Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉]⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)
− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
≥ c ·
nW∑
h=1
Pr[nWR = h] · nW − h
h
,
which is equivalent to⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)
− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
≥ c ·
nW∑
h=1
Pr[nWR = h]
Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉] · nW − h
h
.
It can be shown that due to the binomial nature of nWR,
Pr[nWR = h]
Pr
[
nWR =
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)⌉] = (FWR
FWN
)h−⌈n(1− βδ
nBN
)⌉
.
Therefore the inequality becomes
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)
− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
≥ c ·
nW∑
h=1
(
FWR
FWN
)h−⌈n(1− βδ
nBN
)⌉
· nW − h
h
.
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But this inequality contradicts “HES and LER” since
c > n · βδ
(
FWR
FWN
)
by “HES”,
⇒ c > (n− 1)βδ
(
FWR
FWN
)
since βδ
(
FWR
FWN
)
is positive,
⇒ c > dn− 1eβδ
(
FWR
FWN
)dn
2
−1e
since
FWR
FWN
≤ 1 by “LER”, and n ≥ 3,
⇒ c >
⌈(
1− βδ
nBN
)
n− 1
⌉
βδ
(
FWR
FWN
)d(1−βδ)n−1e
since βδ ≤ 1/2 by “LER”, and nBN ≥ 1,
⇒ c >
⌈(
1− βδ
nBN
)
n− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
(
FWR
FWN
)d(1−βδ/nBN )n−1e
by the reasons above,
⇔ c >
⌈(
1− βδ
nBN
)
n− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
(
FWR
FWN
)d(1−βδ/nBN )ne−1
;
this is the same as
c
(
FWR
FWN
)1−d(1−βδ/nBN )ne
>
⌈(
1− βδ
nBN
)
n− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
,
⇔ c
2∑
h=1
(
FWR
FWN
)h−d(1−βδ/nBN )ne 2− h
h
>
⌈(
1− βδ
nBN
)
n− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
,
nW > 2 and the summation is increasing in the strictly positive summands, so
⇒ c
nW∑
h=1
(
FWR
FWN
)h−d(1−βδ/nBN )ne nW − h
h
>
⌈(
1− βδ
nBN
)
n− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
,
or, rearranging terms,
⇔ c ·
nW∑
h=1
(
FWR
FWN
)h−⌈n(1− βδ
nBN
)⌉
· nW − h
h
>
⌈
n
(
1− βδ
nBN
)
− 1
⌉
βδ
nBN
.
E Proof of Claim 2
To prove the claim, we derive a sufficient condition for PC to be harmful and show that
this condition is met by one particular choice of parameters. However, the reader should
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be aware that the sufficient condition herein derived is far from necessary, and that a
much greater set of parameters are likely to meet the weaker sufficient conditions.
From subsection D.1 we know that, for there to be discrimination in some state, there
have to be at least two white workers, i.e., nW ≥ 2. And, by necessity, there has to be at
least one black worker, i.e., nBN ≥ 1.
Now, from subsection D.2 we know that, under pooling in messages, racist white player
i chooses to attack iff
βδ
nBN
≥ 1− 1
n
[
1 + (nW − 1)FWR
FW
]
,
⇔ FWR
FW
≥ n(1− βδ/nBN)− 1
nW − 1 .
Clearly, if this last condition was met for every possibly-discriminatory state (every
state with nW ≥ 2 and nBN ≥ 1), then a message-pooling equilibrium—like the one ef-
fected by a Political Correctness regime with high enough social sanction—would have
discrimination in every possibly-discriminatory state, as opposed to only in those states
where there are enough white racist players. Because the type distribution has full sup-
port, we know that there are indeed states where the white racists are not enough, and
that these states have a positive probability.
Hence, all we need to do is find the value that FWR
FW
would have to be to in order to be
weakly greater than n(1−βδ/nBN )−1
nW−1 for every state such that nW ≥ 2 and nBN ≥ 1.
It is straight forward to show that the expression n(1−βδ/nBN )−1
nW−1 is maximized for nBN =
n− 2 and nW = 2. The resulting—sufficient—condition is
FWR
FW
≥ (n− 1)− n
n− 2βδ .
It is easy to see that this condition is satisfied—with n = 3—for many parameters F , β, δ.
The condition is extremely strict though and, as the reader may appreciate, is useless for
n ≥ 4. Again, though, we would like to emphasize that a much greater set of parameters
are likely to meet the weaker sufficient conditions.
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